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THE DIVISION OF FARMS UNDER THE 
MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY ACT 1976 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Farming has been the traditional way of life in New Zealand 
since the time of the early European settlers. Extensive sheep farming 
became the norm, to be followed by dairy and cattle fanning, mixed 
cropping and horticulture. Agriculture today provides more than eighty 
percent of New Zealand's export earnings, and so New Zealand's farms, 
1 their production and management are of vital importance. The farm 
has always been typically a family business. The fanner has carried the 
bulk of the physical and managerial work, while the fanner's wife has 
normally been engaged in the care of the children, the running of the 
household, and participating generally in work around the fann. It has 
been an established practice in New Zealand for sons of fanners to 
succeed to the family farm, often being rewarded for years of low-paid 
manual work by purchase of the farm on very generous terms. The purchase 
price was often secured by a mortgage to the father, with livestock and 
farm plant frequently acquired also by a generous mortgage or Deed of 
gift. Such was the kind of family arrangement commonly entered into 
prior to the Matrimonial Property Act 1976. 
This paper is concerned with the effect of the Matrimonial 
Property Act 1976 on farm properties. It will only deal with those 
cases in which the farm itself, having been ascertained matrimonial 
2 property has fallen to · be divided between the spouses as the balance 
of matrimonial property under section 15. 
II. BACKGROUND TO THE CASES 
a. The broad scope of the Matrimonial Property Act 197~: 
The Matrimonial Property Act 1976 is "social legislation of 
the widest general application" 3 and provides in its long title for 
4 
the "equal contribution of husband and wife to the marriage partnership." 
Under the 1963 Act 
4 
the concern was for tracing contributions to 
specific items of property, but the object of the present legislation in 
assessing only contributions to the marriage parnership itselt, is an 
entirely new concept. The idea and meaning of contribution has been 
extended to cover all those elements of family and marital support set 
out in section 18 of the Act. The eight categories in section 18 have 
attempted to give wives the recognition that was often lacking under the 
old legislation and section 18 (2) goes so far as to provide explicitly 
that a contribution of a monetary nature shall not be presumed of greater 
value than a non-monetary contribution. The underlying bias of the Act 
is one of equality, based on the assumption that parties to a marriage 
contribute equally to the partnership. If the partnership breaks down 
solutions are needed and here the Act declares in advance the basis upon 
which matrimonial property will be divided at the end of a marriage. 
The broad scope of the Act provides firstly that the spouses 
share equally in the matrimonial home or homestead, and family chattels. 
Section 12 which provides for the division of a homestead is especially 
relevant to farms, and operates in principle, in the same way as 
5 section 11. Very often the farm homestead and its immediate environs 
cannot be split off from the farm land and become a separate entity 
capable of being sold. For such a case, section 12 provides that the 
spouses share equally in a sum of money which represents the equity in 
the homestead. Having divided the homestead and chattels, the Act 
provides secondly for the husband and wife to share equally in the 
balance of the matrimonial property under section 15. It is only this 
property with which the present paper is concerned. 
While the Court of Appeal in Reid v Reid 
6 
recognised that 
the Act is part of the "wider legislative purpose of ensuring the equal 
status of women in society'' the legislative policy has not always bee~ 
7 so altruistically interpreted. In Baddeley v Baddeley Mahon, J. 
stated that the Act gives 
every wife the right to leave her husband and to claim thereafter one half of the value of a business which he himself built up and maintained. She may leave him for the sole purpose of starting a 
new life with another man, but the right to claim one half of the business assets of her husband remains unaffected. 
-5 
With respect, such an interpretation is not entirely fair. 
The Act does provide for cases of unequal sharing, and a certain amount 
of judicial discretion still exists 8 to manipulate section 15 in such 
a way as to "remedy any injustice" 9 which may have occurred in the 
categorisation of the property. 10 
b. Sections 15 and 18 
Section 15 is concerned with any matrimonial property other 
than the matromonial home or homestead and family chattels. In this 
paper the matrimonial property under examination consists of the farm 
property, or profits from the sale of those farms, livestock, and often 
other items of property such as farm vehicles. Section 15 (1) provides 
that each spouse shall share equally in the matrimonial property "unless 
his or her contribution to the marriage partnership has clearly been 
greater than that of the other spouse". The first step the Court must 
take is to determine whether one spouse's contribution has clearly been 
greater. The onus is on the spouse claiming unequal sharing to establish 
11 a greater contribution. If the onus is discharged section 15 (2) 
provides the second step in the inquiry; "the share of each in the 
matrimonial property ... shall be determined in accordance with the 
contribution of each to the marriage partnership." The apportionment of 
shares is thus a matter for the Court. 12 
Section 15 must be read with section 18 which lists the 
different categories of contributions available to be considered by the 
Court. Section 18 (1) lists the care of children and household duties, 
the provision of money and property, payments and services in respect of 
property, the foregoing of a higher standard of living, and the giving 
of support to the other spouse, as contributions. No special weight can 
be given to any one contribution. Woodhouse J. makes particular mention 
13 
of the "hypnotic influence of money" in Reid v Reid and says that 
the true importance of the contribution of spouses to their marriage 
partnership cannot "be estimated against the curious medium of money". 
Although section 18 (2) gives an explicit direction that contributions 
of a monetary nature are not presumed to be of greater value than 
contributions of a non-monetary nature, the acquisition of property is 
still given substantial weight in some cases under the 1976 Act. 
14. 
• 
6 
c. The Comparison of Contributions 
Whereas the old law was concerned with comparing contributions 
to particular pieces of property, the 1976 Act is involved in the more 
difficult task of comparing unlike things. The tangible and easily 
measured contributions of income and property acquisition must be 
compared with the more intangible performance of child care and house-
hold duties, The marriage partnership itself is the focal point of the 
inquiry, with an evaluation made according to the total achievement of 
each spouse to the marriage, The concern is for the "quality and 
significance to the marriage partnership of the total achievement. It 
is the coherent contributions for the marriage itself that is the 
test ... " 
15 
In assessing the respective contributions of the 
husband and wife in Reid v Reid, the Court of Appeal was obliged to 
carry out the difficult task of comparing an essentially non-monetary 
contribution, with a very large contribution in the form of provision of 
money and acquisition of matrimonial property. Woodhouse J, considered 
the contributions of both spouses in the broadest possible way, con-
sidering their achievement over the whole span of a marriage of twenty-
one years. The husband built up a thriving commercial business and 
accumulated significant capital assets, while the wife balanced this 
effort on the home front with her dutie s as supportive wife and mother 
to four children. In comparing the husband's achievements with the 
twenty-one years of assistance, support and child-rearing by the wife, 
the Court had regard to these services on the home front freeing up the 
husband to exercise his talents for the benefit of the marriage partner-
ship. Had it not been for the extraordinary commercial skill and 
enterprise of the hu sband Woodhouse J. had no doubt that his decision 
would have been "equality in terms of the statutory presumption" . 
16 
However the Court of Appeal found Reid a case for unequal sharing 17 
"in essence because the husband was unusually successful in finding wa~·s 
of harnessing his considerable latent talents." 
18 
The weighing up of total contribution in Reid illustrates the 
recognition the Act gives to the efforts of one spouse in the home being 
intended by both spouses to free the other for work outside the home. 
This point underlies the presumption that equal sharing will be the 
norm. 
• 
7 
Departure from .the norm can only be justified in one of two 
ways: "Inequality in the quality or quantity of effort with which the 
19 
objects of the partnership are pursued" or as Richardson J. stated 
in Reid, only where one spouse has "contributed more overall in quali-
tative or quantitative terms to the marriage partnership ... through his 
20 
or her own positive efforts". The second justification for departure 
from the norm only exists when a greater contribution is made through 
the commitment to the marriage of previously separate property, or as 
Fisher succinctly puts it ''the introduction of capital to the partnership 
in the form of matrimonial property from a source external to the 
operation of the partnership." 
21 
d. Mathematical breakdown of the type of division achieved under 
section 15 
For the purposes of this paper all the High Court decisions 
reported in the four volumes of Matrimonial Property Act Cases have been 
examined, together with two Court of Appeal cases. However only those 
cases where the farm or assets from the sale of a farm have been classified 
matrimonial property, and have then fallen to be divided according to 
section 15 are discusse d here. Thirty-six such cases have been decided 
in the High Court or Court of Appeal under the 1976 Act, as at September 
30th 1981. In nineteen cases equal sharing in the farm property was 
awarded, while in seventeen cases unequal sharing resulted. Because so 
many factors are involved in assessing contributions to any one part-
icular marriage partnership , trends are almost impossible to guage . Of 
the six cases in volume I M.P. Cases, five awarded unequal sharing. 
This could possibly be seen as the equal sharing presumption not having 
b een fully implemented, yet even after Reid these particular cases may 
still have resulted in unequal sharing. Reid v Reid has generally had 
the effect of reaffirming the presumption of equal sharing, yet overall, 
the numb er of cases awarding equal shares has not really increas ed. o: 
the eleven cases report ed in Volume two M.P. Cases, only three resulted 
in unequal sharing, while of the eleven cases repor ted in Volume four 
M.P. Cases (aEter Reid) fiv e resulted in unequal sharing. Only by 
examining the cases in groups relating to how the property was acquired, 
the special contributions pres ent, and the special talents exhibited by 
• 
8 
one spouse or the other, is it possible to realise how the Act is being 
interpreted and what, if any, trends are being developed. 
III. THE LAW IN OPERATION 
a, The Estate Planning Cases unequal division. 
Cases falling under this heading, are those where the husband 
had acquired the farm property on advantageous terms from his family, 
or, if the purchase was not made on generous terms was at least made 
possible because of the father/son relationship. In the "estate planning 
22 
cases" Baddeley, Bleakeley, Manuel, Forde and White, the norm of 
equal sharing was displaced with the wife in each case receiving only 25 
per cent of the matrimonial property. What factors displaced the 
presumption of equal sharing in each of these cases? 
In Baddeley 
23 
where Mahon J, awarded the wife a 25 per cent 
share in a sheep and cattle station, "simple concepts of justice" 
24 
have been the governing criteria in departing from equal sharing. Mr. 
Baddeley senior had assigned to his son for estate planning purposes, a 
substantial interest in the family farm, and a mortgage was executed in 
his favour by the son. To this end the married couple lived on a small 
income for fifteen years and both "the husband and wife were led to 
believe that in return for efficient farm management, the husband would 
attain a farm property of his own through the medium of his father." 
25 
The farm was acquired by the husband one year before the marriage 
breakdown. In the light of those facts Mahon J. proceeded in his 
judgement from an initial assumption that the husband's contribution t0 
the marriage partnership was clearly greater. The wife's contributions 
however were assessed, and she was found to be "a conscientious wife, 
26 
housekee per and devoted mother", the couple had lived on a modest 
income throughout their married life, and "in terms of the marriage 
partnership she made a substantial contribution," 
27 
In terms of the 
section 15 requirements the wife could hardly have done more, yet the 
husband's contribution was assessed as three times greater than hers. 
Contributions to the marriage were not compared, but rather the case was 
• 
9 
based on the clear assumption that the husband's greater contribution 
lay in the physical burden of labour the farmer alone carries out, plus 
the substantial advance the father gave his son in order to acquire an 
interest in the farm property. It was with reluctance that Mahon J. 
awarded a quarter share to the wife, and he concluded that the consequence 
of such division could mean "the destruction of an enterprise to which 
he (the husband) has devoted the whole of his working life." 28 The 
judgement concludes almost with an apology, "I can only repeat that this 
29 is a consequence directed by Parliament, not by me.'' Baddeley's 
case reflects clearly the disquiet experienced by the Courts when faced 
wlth the conflicting claims of new social legislation and the practical 
realities of possibly forcing the sale of a farm . 
While Baddeley did not explicitly regard the father/son 
relationship which enabled the farm to be acquired as a contribution 
30 under section 18, the judgement in Bleakley v Bleakley specifically 
referred to the consequences of such a relationship as a contribution to 
the marriage partnership. The father in Bleakley sold half the farm to 
his son on most favourable terms; a transaction which Speight J. 
regarded as a contribution to the marriage partnership in terms of 
section 18 (1) (d). This sub-section provides for the "acquisition or 
creation of matrimonial property ... " to be regarded as a contribution, 
and Speight J. recognised this as providing for other modes of acquisition 
of property apart from the provision of money. The gaining of matri-
monial property "because of the particular characteristics of the 
husband and the part he played in entering into the transaction with his 
father ... '' 
31 
was considered to be a special contribution to the marriage 
partnership in terms of section 18 (1) (d). Speight J. stated "that the 
young couple would never have had the farm but for the father's gener-· 
osity to the son and the special relationship which existed between 
them," 32 and to this extent concluded that the husband's contribution 
had clearly been greater, thus displacing .the prima facie presumption of 
equality. 
The judgement refers to the care of the children and household 
duties on the part of the wife as contributions under section 18, yet 
states that such work is "largely rewarded in the sharing of the matri-
monial home and is of minimal significance to the balance of matrimonial 
• 
• 
10 
property." 
33 
It is submitted that this contention is unsupported by 
the legislation; section 15 specifically requiring the fixing of shares 
in the balance of the matrimonial property to be "determined in accordance 
with the contribution of each to the marriage partnership.'' Speight J. 
refers at the beginning of his judgement to the legislative move in the 
1976 Act being away from contributions to property, yet, with respect, 
he himself indulges in the language of contribution to property. In 
fixing the respective shares of the parties, Speight J. stated that "the 
wife's contribution was minimal in respect of the matrimonial property," 
while the "husband's contribution to the marriage partnership, in 
relation to the matrimonial property is 75 per cent and the wife 25 per 
33a 
cent". Speight J. used the special status of the husband which 
enabled acquistion of a large proportion of the matrimonial property, as 
the over-riding factor in displacing equal sharing; yet again there is 
an underlying reluctance to force the sale or division of a farm, because 
of legislation which might not accord with the common view of justice 
when applied to the facts of such a case as Bleakley. 
In Hanuel v Manuel 
34 
the husband became the owner of a farm 
through a family settlement whereby he bought the interests of his two 
brothers. However, the significance of the family relationship to the 
acquisition of property was not given any significance by Moller J. 
Rather the husband was considered to have made a greater contribution to 
the marriage partnership in that he was ''a very hard and conscientious 
35 
worker and a very efficient farmer and businessman." The Judge 
preferred the husband's evidence to that of the wife, and in assessing 
contributions for the purposes of section 15 looked at the exhaustive 
list of matters to be considered in section 18. These matters were not 
gone through explicitly, but the wife was considered ''less successful 
36 
than the average housekeeper" and the Judge stated that he had 
given due attention to all aspects of contribution in arriving at a 
figure of 25 per cent to the wife. 
The special status of the husband in relation to his father 
37 
was given significance in Forde v Forde where Roper J. weighed up 
several factors in assessing the contributions of the parties. Roper J. 
stated that "it was Mr. Forde senior's generosity in gifting "Rakahouka" 
• 
11 
(first farm) which gave the couple their start. His later sale of 
"Mabel Bush" (second farm) on favourable terms enabled them to improve 
their lot." 
38 
This contribution coupled with the wife bringing 
nothing in the way of assets to the partnership, was the compelling 
factor in awarding unequal division. 
How do these four cases square with the reasons put forward by 
Fisher and Richardson J. as the only reasons for displacing the equal 
sharing presumption? 
39 
In the writer's view Manuel is the one case where unequal 
40 sharing was awarded on the basis of 'a greater positive effort' by 
the husband to the marriage partnership. While he was a very efficient 
farmer, the wife's contribution was less than average. No criticism 
however, is forthcoming about the wife's domestic contribution in 
Bleakley or Forde, while in Baddeley the wife's contribution on the home 
front was considered substantial. Therefore in Richardson J. 's qualitative 
or quantitative terms there was no greater effort on the part of one 
spouse to the marriage partnership. However the special relationship 
existing between father and son which gave rise to the acquisition of 
substantial matrimonial property could be considered a contribution 
"from a source external to the operation of the partnership." 
41 In 
Bleakley and Forde the nature of the acquisition of property was explicitly 
recognised as a contribution, so as to accord with Fisher's view. 
b. The Estate Planning Cases equal division 
k C k 
42 
V · J d d h . f S ' h J In Coo v oo autier . a opte t e view o peig t . 
in Bleakley that "the acquistion of the farm at some undervalue is 
properly to be regarded as a contribution made by the husband." 43 
However Vautier J went on to regard this contribution as not yielding & 
great deal in monetary terms, and when weighed against other contri-
butions by the wife could not conclude that it called for unequal 
sharing. Rather he preferred to regard the husband and wife as "doing 
(no) more or less than each playing their respective parts in the 
44 
operation of the farm." Two factors emerge in Cook which were 
• 
• 
12 
considered sufficient to retain the norm of equal sharing. Although 
given acknowledgment, the special contribution was regarded only as a 
small monetary gain, rather than as the factor which enabled the couple 
to acquire a farm. The special contribution was therefore assessed on 
the monetary gain it yielded, section 18 (2) was applied, and the 
consequence was equal sharing. Vautier J. also looked closely at the 
contribution of the wife in Cook, particularly at the care she had to 
devote to a child with a physical handicap. The wife also had to "work 
hard in the way most wives of farmers in this country have to work." 
44a 
In comparing the contributions of the parties, having regard to section 
18 (2), Vautier J referred in particular to a passage in the judgement 
45 
of Woodhouse J. in Barton v Barton ... "the onus involves a positive 
demonstration that the contribution is greater to a significant degree 
so that the disparity really stands out in the circumstances of the 
case." In light of this state ment, and looking at the overall contri-
bution to the marriage, Vautier J was "unable to conclude that the 
contribution of the husband to the marriage partnership has clearly been 
greater than that of the wife." 
46 
The reasoning in Cook is a forerunner of that expressed in 
Reid v Reid, and is more in accord with the true spirit of the legi-
slation, than for example, Baddeley. However one doubt still hovers in 
the writer's mind. The monetary gain in Cook was not very great, 
whereas in Baddeley, Bleakley and Forde the monetary gain was consid-
erable. This gives the impression that the enquiry by the Court was 
directed towards contribution to assets rather than to the marriage 
partnership; the very fact of a relationship which gave rise to the 
a c quisition of the farm in the first place is subordinate to the amount 
of monetary gain derived. This, despite section 18 (2) which prohibits 
the placing of greater value on monetary contribution. Would Cook hav~ 
b e en decided differently if Mr. Cook senior had been more generous to 
his son? 
A second estate planning case which accorded equal sharing was 
47 
Scot t v Scott . Although coming af t er the Court of Appeal in Reid 
the facts of Scott are somewhat unusual and Reid is not referred to. 
The husband's father sold the family farm on very generous terms to the 
• 
• 
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husband and wife as tenants-in-common in equal shares. The wife was 
therefore said by Ongley J, to be "contributing to the income bearing 
capacity of the (farm) partnership her one half share of the £arm 
land." 
48 
Ongley J. made the further point that the father as bene-
factor of the spouses must have intended that his daughter-in-law be 
half owner of the family farm lands, and he "would have been well aware 
of the vicissitudes of marriage and possible complications in relation 
to jointly owned property which might follow upon a divorce." 49 The 
Judge concluded that this joint ownership was 'highly fortuitous' to the 
wife but 
she was justified.,.in asserting that the benefit which she received 
by the transfer to her of an interest in the farm lands upon 
favourable terms was intended for her whether or not circumstancPs 
permitted her to enjoy it within the framework of the marriage. 50 
Upon the basis of joint mmership, Ongley J. was unable to depart from 
equal sharing although he made the observation that "growing awareness 
of the effects of the legislation will probably cause the heads of 
51 farming families to arrange their affairs differently in future years.'' 
A case similar to Scott was Saxton v Saxton 
52 
where the 
wife was given an equal interest in the farm lands by means of a 
partnership agreement between the parties. The original gift from the 
husband's family was not considered a special contribution by the 
husband in light of the subsequent agreement. As in Scott an equal 
interest in the land r esul t e d in equal sharing of the land on the 
breakup of the marriage. The holding of property in joint own e rship was 
certainly fortuitous for both wives in these cases, for in light of the 
preceding estate-planning cases, had the legal arrangements been 
different in Scott and Saxton the wives may not have been treated as 
generously. 
c. Estate Planning Cases decid e d after Reid v Reid 
In B!_eak½y Speight J. referred to the difficulties which can 
arise in the interpretation of n ew legislation. In particular, he said 
we are still exploring and are as yet without appellate guidance on 
many of the difficult questions of interpretation, particularly on 
.. , ... 
P. "'1 L 
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such matters as arise under section 18 as to what constitutes 
contribution, and what room there is for giving different weight in 
cases where there are a number of contributing factors. 53 
In Reid v. Reid the Court of Appeal gave very clear guidance as to the 
54 interpretation and application of sections 15 and 18. Since Reid 
two cases have come to the High Court, in which the matrimonial property 
having been acquired on advantageous terms from the husband's family, 
has fallen to be divided between the spouses on the basis of section 15. 
White v. White's case 55 bears a close similarity in its 
facts to Bleakley. In considering the assistance the father gave his 
son in acquiring the farm land, Bisson J. in White found that "the 
father's assistance to the husband during the marriage ... amounts to a 
substantial contribution by the husband to the marriage partnership 
under section 18 (1) (d) of the Act. 
56 
Bissen J. proceeded from this 
point based on the view of Speight J. in Bleakley and stated that "I 
would have considered their (the spouses') contributions equal except 
for the husband's contribution under section 18 (1) (d)." One inter-
pretation of the special status contribution in the preceding cases is 
that the monetary gain derived from the relationship is of greater value 
as a contribution, than the fact of the relationship itself, even though 
it was the relationship which gave rise to the acquisition of the 
property in the first place. In White Bisson J. accorded precedence to 
the latter view, stating that, 
although ... the husband did not have separate property at the time 
of the marriage ... and although the husband did not acquire his 
intere st in the farm land at an undervalue, it was nevertheless 
assistance from his family which enabled the husband ... in the first 
place to acquire the farming livestock and implements and subse-
quently the land. 57 
Bisson J. held that that father's assistance amounting to an on-dernana 
intere st-free debt was a contribution under section 18 (1) (d). The 
Jud ge also considered the contribution of the wife in the care of 
children and manag~nent of household duties finding that she had carried 
58 them out "practically unaided and satisfactorily. She helped with 
the fa rm in a minor wa y, wo r ked outsid e the home to bring in a little 
extra cash, and "not only played her full part as a wife and mother, but 
enabled the husband to devote practically the whole of his time and 
15 
. h f ., 59 attention tote arm. The wife also made a contribution under 
section 18 (1) (g) in foregoing a higher standard of living than would 
otherwise have been available, and "went without to improve the husband's 
60 
financial position." However once the husband's contribution under 
section 18 (1) (d) was brought into play the ''scales tip markedly in his 
61 62 
favour." The "great imbalance in the contribution of the parties" 
led Bisson J, to find that the husband's contribution to the marriage 
partnership was clearly greater and that the wife's share of the matrimonial 
property should be fixed at 25 per cent. 
The Court in White was obviously confident in asserting that 
the contribution by the husband to the marriage partnership was three 
times greater than that of the wife, despite her contribution being 
entirely worthwhile and adequate. Yet Woodhouse J, in Reid v Reid 
stated that 
It must surely be a striking situation if the Court could stand 
back and confidently assert against a competent and dutiful husband 
or wife that the achievement of the other for the marriage had 
been so remarkable that the spouse concerned had done for example 
twice as well. 63 
Was the on-demand interest-free debt gained by the husband in White such 
a remarkable achievement as to render his contribution to the marriage 
three times more valuable? 
The second case involving the acquistion of a farm on advantageous terms 
t o come to the High Court since Reid v. Reid, was the case of Reid v Reid 
64 
Greig J. In this case the matrimonial property comprised a block of 
land which was obtaine d by the husband from his father some years after 
a first block of land had been gifted. Greig J, did not regard the 
posi tion of the husband in relation to his father as the means by which 
the matrimonial property was acquired. Rather he looked at the "notional 
65 
assistance" of the father in the purchase of the second block of 
land, and pr~narily the husband's farming efforts which produced the 
concrete assets of the marriage. Although the husband's contribution 
was undoubtedly greater in money terms, Greig J, weighed this against 
the section 18 contributions of the wife. She was a dutiful wife and 
mothe r, did some work around the farm, and carried on a business outside 
16 
the home for some periods of the marriage. Complying with the meaning 
and application of section 15 and 18, in Reid v. Reid, Greig J. concluded 
that "giving due consideration to each contribution ... the parties must 
share equally in the remainder of the matrimonial property." 
The resolution of difficulties inherent in sections 15 and 18, 
particularly in respect to the weight to be accorded any one contribution, 
has not resulted from the appellate guidance offered by Reid. Two 
questions remain to be answered. Firstly, should the special status 
contribution be regarded as a contribution at all under section 18 (1) 
(d)? The contribution a son is able to give because of his family's 
generosity does not spring from his own efforts, but rather from good 
fortune in being the son of his father. This good fortune is also 
accorded a wife who marries one of these favoured sons, resulting in a 
fortunate couple being given a chance to acquire a farm, which in today's 
economic climate is impossible for most young people. However, on 
marriage break-up, the inquiry demanded by the Act is directed towards 
the marriage partnership. The favoured situation of succeeding to the 
family farm must certainly be a substantial contribution to the marriage, 
without which the married state would have been entirely different. The 
source of such a contribution is traceable directly to the husband's 
family and as such is a contribution brought by him to the marriage 
partnership. The acquisition of the farm has come from a "source 
66 
external to the marriage" and in the writer's view must be accorded 
du e weight as a contribution, given the circumstances of the case, 
The second question left unanswered since Reid is whether the 
special status will b e regarded as a greater contribution due to the 
monetary gain involved, or because it occasioned the acquisition of 
property in the first place. Bearing in mind that section 18 (2) 
prohibits the presumption that a monetary contribution is of greater 
value tha n a non-monetary one, it is the writer's view that the second 
interpretation should be followed. The opportunity accorded by the 
special status which enabled acquisition of the family farm is a 
substantial contribution to the marriage , despite the extent of under-
value granted by the father. It may be that on a weighing up of the 
contributions of both spouses the special status will not constitute a 
• 
17 
clearly greater contribution, but in the writer's view it normally will. 
As a contribution to the marriage partnership it will be hard to equal 
by child care and household duties, unless as in Cook and Reid the Court 
views the contribution as not yielding much in monetary terms. 
d. Advanta eous terms arisin from some other form of s ecial status 
Advantageous terms for the acquisition of a farm can come from 
sources other than some benefaction or family transaction. However 
these sources must come within the types of contribution lis~ed in 
67 
Section 18. In Denyer v. Denyer the husband claimed a greater 
contribution to the marriage partnership in that as a Maori he was able 
to obtain a lease of Maori land on favourable terms, purchase the shares 
of other Maori owners, and finally purchase the freehold on favourable 
terms. Barker J. was thus faced with the question of whether an accident 
of birth constituted a contribution under section 18. He agreed that 
the "husband's Maori blood was at least an advantage to the parties; it 
helped the parties to obtain the lease and advantageous finance. It 
68 facilitated the buying of the freehold.'' However the Court was 
unable to hold that being of Maori blood was a contribution; such a 
possible contribution was not listed in the statutory definitions under 
section 18 which the Court regarded as an exhaustive list. In support 
of this decision Barker J. held Denyer not to be comparable to Baddeley, 
Bleaklev and Manue!_ which he distinguished as "estate planning cases." 
Section 18 (1) (d) states that a contribution can mean the acquisition 
or creation of matrimonial property, and under this provision the 
special status of a son in relation to his father was regarded as a 
contribution in Bleakley, if not as explicitly in Baddeley and Manuel. 
Being of Maori blood is no more or less an accident of birth than being 
the son of a farmer, and in the writer's view it is difficult to see wi.y 
the husband in _Qenyer was not awarded the special status contribution. 
The second ground adopted by the Court in Denyer for rejecting 
unequal sharing was the section 15 onus on the spouse claiming a greater 
contribution, to prove that greater contrubution. Barker J. considered 
the contribution of the wife to the marriage partnership; she cared for 
the children and performed household duties satisfactorily but "did not 
18 
do as much farm work as many farmers' wives have been known to do" 69 
Yet the Court in Denyer concluded that the husband had not discharged 
the onus on him, and accordingly the matrimonial property was to be 
shared equally. 
A second case where the husband's status enabled the acqui-
sition of a farm on advantageous terms was Foss v. Foss 7o In this 
case the husband was a returned servicemen, and in 1944 was entitled to 
a rehabilitation loan. The parties married and purchased a "hard back 
country" farm with a 100 per cent rehabilitation loan. In Foss the 
wife's contribution was "of a high order"; living frugally, supervising 
the children's education through correspondence school, a good wife and 
mother, contributing monetary bequests she had received, and contri-
buting to some extent to the farm work. In comparing contributions the 
Court gave due weight to the husband's incompetence in farm management, 
although it did not amount to "gross and palpable" misconduct under 
section 18 (3). Yet the Court awarded an unequal division of the farm 
property. White J. stated that "where the basic asset is a farm property 
owned and brought into the matrimonial property with a substantial 
equity by the husband, it will be rare for a wife to be able to claim 
half." 
7
oa The 100 per cent rehabilitation loan was undoubtedly a 
special contribution without which the couple would probably never have 
acquired the farm. However when the contributions of both spouses 
throughout a marriage of thirty years are compared, it is difficult to 
regard the loan as giving the husband a greater contribution to the 
marriage partnership. It is the writer's view that Foss could have been 
decided differently had it come to the High Court after the decision of 
the Court of Appeal in Reid. Woodhouse J. 's direction to look at the 
''quality and significance to the marriage partnership of the total 
71 
achievement'' would surely have resulted in equal sharing in Foss. 
Foss and Denyer are not easily reconcilable. Barker J. in 
72 
Denyer and also in Black v. Black, insisted that the expression 
73 'clearly been greater' had a real and distinc tive meaning. He 
adopted the view of Somers J. in Barron v. Barron 74 who claimed that 
the "phrase means greater by a distinctive and real margin - one which 
compels recognition." In Reid v. Reid Woodhouse J. approved the 
• 
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stance he took in Barton, and insisted on certainty and "a clear line of 
demarcation between those cases that will automatically result in an 
equal division of property and the remainder which are affected by the 
. " proviso. 75. In requiring a clear disparity in contributions in 
order to displace the norm of equal sharing it is the writer's view that 
Barker J. in Denyer took an approach preferable to that taken in Foss. 
e. Cases in which the matrimonial property has stemmed from 
previously separate property. 
In Reid v. Reid, Richardson J. stated that 
The rationale for treating the prov1.s1.on by one spouse of previously 
separate property as an additional contribution is that the separate 
property did not itself result from the operations of the marriage 
partnership. 76 
If the matrimonial net is cast wide under section 8 (e) recognition will 
be given to contributions of previously separate property in order to 
balance any possible injustice in the classification. It appears to the 
writer that a certain amount of discretion is contemplated in the 
application of section 15. This was specifically noted by Hardie Boys 
77 J. in Bowen v. Bowen where he stated that "I imagine the legislation 
intended that where there was injustice it could to some extent be dealt 
,.:ith under section 15." This comment was made with regard to the 
" injustice" of section 9 (3) in Bowen; the capital which provided the 
original farm, the increase in value of which was classified as matri-
monial property, was regarded as of such significance as to replace 
equal sharing . The wife was only responsible for a small part of the 
increased value of the property. 
In Davidson v. Davidson 
78 
the husband came to the marriage 
with $4 , 000 cash, and a farm property acquired subject to a large mort;age 
debt. Because Chilwe ll J. did not regard the proper ty as having been 
" acquired" 
79 
until the mortgage debt was fully repaid, the farm was 
classified as matrimonial property . In light of this decision Chilwell 
J. thought it "just to give the husband credit for the two amounts which 
80 
total $12,000," and the Court awarded 60 per cent of the matri-
monial property to the husband. Unequal sharing was thus awarded in 
• 
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Davidson because the matrimonial net had been cast wide and had caught 
previously separate property, a situation which the Court wanted to 
recognise despite the initial classification. 
An award of 60 per cent was also made to the husband in 
81 Searle v. Searle. In this case the matrimonial property was the 
surplus arising from the sale of a farm; a farm acquired from the husband's 
family three months after marriage. Rather than considering the husband's 
status in relation to his family and subsequently the farm, as a special 
contribution, Cook J. directed his inquiry more to the work the husband 
had done on the farm prior to the marriage. The husband had spent 
twelve years prior to his marriage working to improve the family farm. 
He had financed developments on the farm while earning his own living, 
provided his own labour for work on the farm, and, by the time of his 
marriage the improvements directly attributable to his efforts exceeded 
$3,000. On the basis of such effort by the husband the Court regarded 
his contribution as "inevitably greater." It is in accord with justice 
and with Reid v. Reid that such a gain to the matrimonial property, 
achieved before marriage, should be given due recognition. 
The Court of Appeal had occasion to consider the extent to 
which pre-marital property created a clearly greater contribution by one 
82 spouse in Maw v . Maw. The pre-marital assets acquired by the husband 
consisted of a farm property which he owned with his brother as tenants 
in common in equal shares. The two brothers were farming in equal 
partnership before the marriage and although this farm was classified by 
the Court as separate property, two further farms were acquired after 
the marriage by the partnership. These two farms held by the partner-
ship were classified as matrimonial property within the meaning of 
section 8 (e) and fell to be divided under section 15. The Court of 
Appeal unanimously found the husband's contribution to have been greate:: , 
and this conclusion "largely rests upon the powerful impetus or stimula\lt 
given to the prosperity of the marriage partnership by the husband's 
83 pre-marital interest in the farming partne rship." The pre-marital 
asset became the foundation of the subsequent acquisitions and although 
the wife contributed adequately in all the ways she could under section 
18, Richardson J. found that the husband's contribution was "a dominating 
.. 
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consideration ... the springboard which enabled (the partners) to acquire 
the two further blocks of land." 
84 
"That was a major and significant 
contribution ... (and) ranks for special consideration over and above 
regular contributions made in the course of the operations of the 
85 
marriage partnership." The Court of Appeal in Maw increased the 
wife's contribution from 20 per cent to one third, stating that the High 
Court decision "given relatively early in the history of the judicial 
administration of the Act (gave) too much weight ... to the property 
position achieved by the husband before the marriage." 
86 
In the writer's view the Court of Appeal's change was a 
correct one. A fine balancing is evident between the wife's very 
adequate contribution, and the husband's substantial property position 
coupled with his ordinary contribution as a farmer. The wife's achieve-
ment must be duly recognised, as it was by the award of a third of the 
property. To have awarded her half of this matrimonial property which 
had so largely sprung from a source external to the marriage partnership 
would not accord with the spirit of the legislation, which requires a 
just division, 
Three further cases in 1981 confirm the view of Richardson J. 
in Reid v. Reid that although the matrimonial net may be cast widely 
under section 8 (e) this is balanced by th~ recognition of contributions 
of previously separate property. Bowen as already discussed was one of 
87 88 
these cases, together with Best v. Best and Cormack v. Cormack . 
In Best the matrimonial property was acquired from the proceeds of the 
sale of an orchard and dairy-farm which had been the husband's separate 
property prior to marriage. The husband's contribution was considered 
to have been clearly greater in that he "provided the foundation of the 
matrimonial assets." 
89 
One aspect of Cormack directly comparable to 
Foss v. Foss was the provision by the husband of a farm acquired by a 
100 per cent rehabilitation loan. Cook J. claimed that the value of th2 
loan must not be und er-rated, but unlike Foss, the original farm in 
Cormack provided a property base on which the husband was able to build. 
This contribution, coupled with the sound and prosperous business the 
husband built up, was sufficient to displace the equal sharing pre-
sumption. 
• 
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f. Cases in which the contribution of the wife has clearly been greater: 
So far in this review, all cases for unequal sharing have been 
in favour of the husband. However two cases have accorded the wife a 
clearly greater contribution to the marriage partnership, and hence a 
greater share in the matrimonial property. The first of these was 
Godfrey v. Godfrey 
90 
which although awarding unequal sharing, did not 
give the parties an overall percentage distribution. Rather, certain 
items of matrimonial property were vested in one spouse or the other. 
In weighing the respective contributions of the spouses, Jeffries J. had 
cause to apply section 18 (3). This subsection referring to misconduct 
has the effect of diminishing a spouse's contribution to the marriage 
partnership if that misconduct was "gross and palpable," and affected 
the value of the property to a significant degree. In this case the 
husband's misconduct related to the inexplicable disappearance of income 
from the farm. The husband was unable to account for money which had 
come into his possession, and coupled with a poor work record on the 
farm and as a husband, the application of section 18 (3) was called for. 
On the other hand the wife made many positive contributions. She 
provided the matrimonial home from her o~m resources, a gift from her 
father supplied the farm land on which the husband could work, and a 
further loan from the father purchased entirely another block of land. 
Besides the relationship with her father which enabled the acquisition 
of further land and the initial injection of property into the marriage, 
Mrs. Godfrey also contributed to the marriage partnership by the rearing 
of five children and making a substantial contribution to the farming 
operation. In awarding her a substantial proportion of the property, 
the Judge made explicit reference to the property being for her and her 
children, rather than for her alone, although no property was settled in 
the names of the children under section 26 (1). Similarly in Owens v. Owens 
Greig J. made this same point explicit. After claiming that Mrs. Owens' 
contributions to the marriage partnership had clearly been greater he 
stated that "the order I will make, although nominally in favour of the 
wife is to take into account the position of the children and the regard 
92 that has to be had for them." Jeffries J. in Godfrey referred to 
this as supporting the fami ly as a group and suggested that as Mrs. 
Godfrey had been generously treated by her family "she would understand 
• 
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her obligations with her children." 93 Similarly Mrs. Owen and her 
family had provided the original capital which set the parties up, and 
Mrs. Owen then proceeded to rear the family and do more farming duties 
than a wife normally does. Although section 18 (3) was not applied in 
94 Owen, the husband's farming capabilities were "no more than adequate." 
The stipulation that both Mrs. Godfrey and Mrs. Owen retain 
only a life interest in the farm and must be mindful of their obligations 
to the chidren is interesting. No such requirement has been made where 
the husband has retained the farm. Presumably the requirement is an 
indication of the Court's awareness that farm work is a man's work, and 
that if a wife is to retain the farm she must do so on trust for others. 
The practical realities of farm life appear to be important consider-
ations for the Court. 
g. The contribution of wives to work on the farm 
The final group of cases to be discussed in this paper involve 
situations where no substantial pre-marital assets existed, no special 
family arrangements entered into, and no exceptional talents exhibited 
by either spouse. In the case of the average couple beginning married 
life with very few assets, the application of the section 18 scheme 
would proceed on the basis that the efforts of one spouse on the home 
front are intended by both spouses to free the other for work outside 
the home for the benefit of the marriage. Contributions from one spouse 
may be greater at certain times, but the legislative presumption is 
''that the respective contributions of the spouses ... will be in balance 
95 at the end of the day." Without any of the external factors so far 
discussed, the weighing and comparing of contributions will involve on:j 
those contributions made by the spouses in the regular course of their 
marriage partnership. Hence the contribution of a famer's wife to the 
work on th e farm achieves importance. 
Throughout the whole range of matrimonial property cases 
involving farms, a great deal of evidence has been directed towards the 
amount of farm work a wife has done. The Courts have tended to adopt 
the presumption, correctly in the writer's view, that being a farmer's 
wife has naturally involved outdoor farm work. Even if a husband has 
denied the extent of farm work his wife has done, the Courts have still 
tended to give credit for such work. 
the contrary as in Buckman v. Buckman, 
Unless direct evidence is given to 
96 
the Courts have assumed that 
being a farmer's wife equates with assisting in farm work. The expec-
tation exists that farm wives will do more work than town wives, yet the 
Courts are reluctant to categorise the contribution under any of the 
provisions of section 18. In the writer's view section 18 (1) (f) (i) 
would be the correct provision, providing as it does for the "perfor-
mance of work or services in respect of the matrimonial property." 
Maybe in this respect the Courts have always tended to look globally at 
the marriage, rather than regarding section 18 as an exhaustive list. 
Does the farmer's wife have to show that she contributed to 
the farm work in order to ensure equal sharing in the property? The 
amount of judicial thinking on this point would indicate that she does, 
yet an examination of all the High Court decisions has revealed that the 
Judges readily accept the presumption that a farmer's wife will have 
done farm work. Perhaps it is the result of this presumption that 
manifests itself in a farm wife receiving a larger financial award on 
marriage break-up than a town wife would normally expect. Of the six or 
so cases falling strictly into the present category, all resulted in 
equal sharing. 
The actual extent of the farmer's wife's work has not been an 
97 over-riding factor in assessing contributions. In Reed v. Reed 
the wife attended to milking and assisted substantially with the general 
98 farm work. However in Tickle v. Tickle the Judge accepted that the 
wife ''assisted her husband as much as she was physically and emotionally 
able." In both these cases the marriage partnership manifested itself in 
joint partnership agreements with regard to the farm, thus supporting 
the notion of equality between the spouses. However the facts of Reed 
indicated a substantial amount of physical work done by the wife, while 
the facts in Tickle suggested much less, yet both Judges gave the wife 
sufficient credit for her labours to maintain equal sharing. A good 
example of the Courts equating being a farmers' wife with doing farm 
• 
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work, is Dyson v. Dyson. 
99 
Casey J. stated that "It needs little 
imagination to appreciate the efforts required of a wife on a town milk 
supply farm in bearing six children over the space of eight years." 
Moller J. was not quite as appreciative of the farmer's wife's role in 
100 
Manuel where he viewed the wife as "less successful than the 
average housekeeper." "She did very little indeed other than her 
domestic duties as a wife and mother." Moller J. thus indicated clearly 
that he expected the farm wife to do more than domestic duties, yet in 
the writer's view the lack of farm work here did not occasion the 
unequal sharing. Manuel was an estate planning case in which the 
husband's contribution would have been impossible to equal. Likewise 
101 
the wife in Baddeley made a substantial contribution to the farm 
work, but this was of little account when compared with the special 
contribution of the husband. 
The farmer's wife is expected to assist on the farm, the 
Courts have assumed that she does, and have given her credit for it. 
All other contributions being equal, the farm work may assist the wife 
in ensuring equal sharing, yet if other special contributions have been 
made the wife's farm work will not generally balance the scales evenly. 
The wife's work is not so much a specific contribution, as 
part of a total package. The inquiry is directed towards the marriage 
partnership and it is the totality of her contribution to that partner-
ship that counts at the end of the day. If that overall contribution is 
lacking the wife will not be seen to have played her part in the marriage. 
102 
Such a case was Buckman, where, throughout a marriage of eleven 
years, the wife spent five of those years in and out of mental hospitals. 
Quilliam J. considered that she was unable to participate in the farm 
work itself, but more important was the reduction in quality of her 
general contribution to the marriage itself. On these facts Quilliam J. 
found that the husband's contribution was inevitably greater and award~d 
the wife one third of the matrimonial property. 
CONCLUSION 
In dealing with the division of farm properties under the 
Matrimonial Property Act 1976 the Courts have been faced with a conflict 
• 
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between competing interests: on the one hand the claims of new social 
legislation with its strong bias in favour of equality, and on the other 
the practical realities involved in giving effect to that equality. 
The farm situation is possibly unique in that equal division 
of the property will probably result in the sale of the farm. The sums 
of money involved are so large that this is usually the only course. 
The sale of a farm has the added effect however, of depriving the farmer 
of his means of livelihood, possibly destroying a venture his whole 
working life has been directed to, and depriving the children of the 
chance to succeed to the family farm. Against such consequences the 
Courts have striven to assert the principles of the new Act. They have 
given due recognition to the part played by women, not only as wives and 
mothers, but also as farmers' wives. The presumption that a farmer's 
wife will inevitably assist in farm work has been given credit by the 
Courts, while the notion of joint partnership has been given its literal 
interpretation. 
In providing a "just division of the matrimonial property," 103 
the Courts have had to weigh and balance these competing interests, and 
generally fair results have been achieved. The earlier cases were still 
property orientated to a certain extent, but it was inevitable that such 
a totally new concept as "contribution to the marriage partnership" 
would take time to become absorbed and truly interpreted by those adminis-
tering the Act. However the injustice of equal sharing, particularly in 
the estate planning cases, and cases like Maw, was also apparent. To 
counteract the possible injustice of a wife leaving the marriage of her 
own accord and taking ,vith her half the family farm, the Courts have 
eagerly sought for exceptions to the equal sharing presumption of 
section 15. In doing so they have relied heavily on the special 
status contribution and the discretion given by section 15 to counterac~ 
the effects of a broad classification of matrimonial property. Attri-
buting significant weight to these types of contribution has, in the 
writer's view, been a fair way to tackle division of farm properties. 
The share percentages awarded to wives since Reid v. Reid has 
tended to be an increase on the 25 per cent given in the early estate 
• 
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planning cases, although White, coming after Reid, showed some reluctance 
to increase the share in this type of case. However the principles 
laid down in Reid gave much needed appellate guidance, and have resulted 
in the Courts coming more readily to a decision for equal sharing in 
appropriate cases. 
Amongst the multitude of factors involved in each particular 
case, are the personal convictions and principles of the Judge himself. 
Whilst doing his utmost to balance the competing contributions, the 
broader competing interests often weigh more heavily with him on one 
side or the other. Some Judges have interpreted the Act strictly 
according to its spirit and tenor, while others have been unwilling to 
prejudice the farmer too much and have given greater deference to the 
broader practical realities . 
• 
• 
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